Ritesh Sinha
India’s foreign and economic policy is undergoing a striking transformation amid rapidly shifting global equations, and the BRICS grouping has emerged as one of the most consequential arenas of this change. Not long ago, the political narrative around China was dominated by “Go Back China”, particularly after the Galwan Valley clash, border tensions and concerns over Chinese companies. Today, however, China has emerged as India’s largest merchandise trading partner. The shift is not merely diplomatic; it reflects the hard realities of economics. India increasingly appears determined to engage both Washington and Beijing on the basis of national interest rather than align itself uncritically with either camp.
The 2026 BRICS Summit assumes particular significance because India holds the BRICS chairmanship this year. The grouping is no longer confined to Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa. With Egypt, Ethiopia, Iran, the United Arab Emirates, Saudi Arabia and Indonesia joining the expanded framework, BRICS has evolved into an 11-member platform with considerable economic and geopolitical weight.
The most revealing question is why India-China trade continues to expand even as Western powers pursue strategies aimed at reducing China’s economic influence. The answer lies in the numbers. In the financial year 2025–26, merchandise trade between India and China reached approximately $151.10 billion. India exported goods worth $19.47 billion to China while importing $131.63 billion, leaving India with a staggering trade deficit of $112.16 billion. China has consequently overtaken the United States as India’s largest merchandise trading partner.
These figures expose India’s dependence on Chinese supply chains, but they also demonstrate the limits of political slogans in shaping economic relations. China remains deeply embedded in India’s electronics, telecommunications equipment, machinery, chemicals, industrial inputs and manufacturing ecosystems. The real challenge for New Delhi, therefore, is not simply to stop trading with China, but to reduce the structural imbalance while simultaneously diversifying supply chains and strengthening domestic manufacturing.
This is where BRICS assumes strategic economic importance. According to India’s Ministry of Commerce, merchandise trade among BRICS countries reached $1.17 trillion in 2024, compared with only $84 billion in 2003. In just over two decades, intra-BRICS merchandise trade has expanded nearly fourteen-fold. India’s merchandise exports to BRICS countries stood at around $82 billion in FY2025–26, while India’s services exports to BRICS members were estimated at $31.3 billion in 2024.
The political significance of these numbers cannot be understated. BRICS is no longer merely a diplomatic forum for annual summits and declarations. It is increasingly becoming a platform for trade, energy, finance, payment systems, technology, resilient supply chains and the broader economic interests of the Global South. The BRICS trade ministers’ meeting in August 2026 further underlined this direction, with discussions centred on the BRICS Economic Partnership 2030 and stronger financial support for micro, small and medium enterprises.
For India, the expansion of trade with BRICS economies presents an opportunity of enormous scale. The United Arab Emirates has become one of India’s most important commercial partners. Russia remains critical for energy, defence and strategic commodities. Saudi Arabia is central to India’s energy and investment relationship. Indonesia is important for coal, palm oil and other commodities. Brazil offers opportunities in agriculture, food, mining and critical resources, while South Africa provides India with an important gateway into the wider African market.
The point is crucial: India’s BRICS opportunity is not synonymous with China. It is an 11-country economic landscape spanning energy, food security, minerals, pharmaceuticals, technology, manufacturing, agriculture, digital payments and services. India’s strategic success will depend on whether it can transform BRICS from a platform for importing goods into a major destination for Indian exports, technology and services.
This is also the context in which the shift from “Go Back China” to “Welcome China” must be understood. It does not necessarily represent an ideological embrace of Beijing. Rather, it reflects a more pragmatic approach in which economic interests are increasingly separated from political rhetoric. India can expand trade with China while simultaneously maintaining a firm position on its borders, national security and strategic interests.
The evolution of India’s investment policy offers another indication of this pragmatic recalibration. In 2026, New Delhi introduced limited relaxation in investment rules concerning entities from countries sharing a land border with India. Yet this should not be mistaken for unrestricted economic openness. Security-sensitive sectors, ownership concerns and issues relating to effective control continue to attract scrutiny. The message is therefore clear: India is willing to engage economically with China, but without surrendering strategic autonomy.
The deeper geopolitical story, however, lies beyond bilateral trade.
From Bretton Woods to BRICS: The Emerging Challenge to Dollar Dominance
The Bretton Woods system established after the Second World War placed the US dollar at the centre of the international financial architecture. Over subsequent decades, the dollar’s role in global trade, energy markets, banking and cross-border finance gave Washington extraordinary economic and strategic leverage.
Today, discussions within BRICS on local-currency trade, alternative payment mechanisms and the possible interoperability of central-bank digital currencies represent part of a broader attempt to diversify that architecture. The objective is not necessarily to abolish the dollar overnight, but to create additional channels through which emerging economies can conduct trade and financial transactions without excessive dependence on a single currency or financial system.
In August 2026, Reserve Bank of India Governor Sanjay Malhotra said BRICS countries were discussing the possibility of linking fast-payment systems and central-bank digital currencies. The broader objective is to reduce the cost and friction of cross-border payments and expand the use of local currencies. The discussions remain a work in progress, but their strategic significance is difficult to ignore.
This does not mean that the dollar is about to disappear, nor that the Bretton Woods system has simply “ended”. The reality is more complex. The international monetary system is becoming increasingly multipolar. The dollar remains overwhelmingly important, but countries such as China, India, Russia and Brazil are exploring mechanisms that could reduce excessive dependence on any single currency or financial infrastructure.
For India, this transformation offers both opportunity and risk. The opportunity lies in giving the rupee a larger role in regional and international commerce. The risk is that local-currency settlement cannot by itself solve India’s structural trade deficit with China. Currency diversification must therefore be accompanied by export competitiveness, domestic manufacturing and supply-chain resilience.
India’s role in BRICS should consequently extend far beyond closer engagement with Beijing. New Delhi must use the grouping as an export platform. Indian pharmaceuticals, automobiles, agricultural products, machinery, defence equipment, information technology, digital services and manufactured goods should gain deeper access to BRICS markets.
India’s total exports reached a record $863.1 billion in FY2025–26, comprising $441.8 billion in merchandise exports and $421.3 billion in services exports. The strategic question now is how much more of this export capacity India can channel towards the expanding BRICS marketplace.
There is also a message here for Washington. India is neither America’s adversary nor China’s strategic satellite. It is increasingly pursuing a policy of strategic autonomy. Partnership with the United States in technology, trade and security can coexist with energy ties with Russia, commercial engagement with China and institutional leadership within BRICS.
That is the essence of India’s emerging foreign-policy doctrine: engage widely, align selectively and decide independently.
Even the debate surrounding public-health concerns such as H1N1 must be kept separate from political speculation. Health emergencies should not be casually linked to the political fortunes of individual leaders such as Rahul Gandhi or Arvind Kejriwal without credible evidence. Public health is a matter of governance and preparedness; political competition is a separate democratic process.
India’s larger challenge is therefore clear: trade with China without becoming dependent on China; partner with America without becoming subordinate to American pressure; purchase energy from Russia without becoming dependent on a single source; and lead BRICS without allowing it to become merely another geopolitical bloc.
The journey from “Go Back China” to “Welcome China” is consequently more than a change in political vocabulary. It reflects a pragmatic recalibration of Indian foreign policy in which trade, investment, technology and national interest increasingly matter more than ideological posturing.
The future of BRICS will not be determined by whether the dollar disappears overnight. Its significance will be measured by whether it can contribute to a more diversified and genuinely multipolar global economic order.
For India, this is the opportunity of the century. If New Delhi can use BRICS to expand its exports, strengthen the rupee, deepen manufacturing, diversify supply chains and increase its influence across the Global South, BRICS will become more than a counterweight to China or the United States.
It could become one of the principal instruments through which India shapes the economic architecture of the 21st century.
